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Abstract 
Child labourers play an integral role in households’ income diversification process by 
contributing to farm and non-farm incomes but policies, including that of the ILO have focused 
largely on eliminating child labour from the agricultural sector through education. This study 
sought to ascertain the relative contribution of child labourers to farm and non-farm income 
using the GLSS6 data and employed a SUR estimation that simulated, empirically, with child’s 
education. Findings showed that as a child labourer spends more time in school, every Gh₵1.00 
contributed to farm income is accompanied by a Gh₵2.12 contribution towards non-farm 
income. By implication, child education policy removes child labourers from the farm but are 
likely to have a paradoxical effect of pushing these children into non-farm activities as they 
engage in them after school and during weekends. The suggestion is that governments must 
provide adequate remuneration for workers and pay a good price for agricultural products so 
that households do not use children as instruments to diversity their income portfolios, since 
child labour acts as a push factor in the diversification process.  
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Introduction 
In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), agriculture has been the main economic activity to 
households, with rural households forming the majority. Just like many countries in this sub-
region, the agricultural sector in Ghana is the largest employer as it employs 54.2 percent of the 
total population, which also translates into 45.8 percent households (Ghana Statistical Service - 
GSS, 2014a). In spite of the major role this sector plays in economic development, -it is 
bedevilled with many challenges such as land tenure, bad weather (rainfall and drought), bush 
fires (August-November – coinciding with peak hunting period), bad post-harvest activities, 
access to financial services, unavailable market, transport challenges etc. These challenges, over 
time, have left agricultural households with no option than to diversify their income sources by 
adding on non-farm activities as a risk-coping strategy (Cervantes-Godoy, Kimura, & Antón, 
2013). According to Agyeman, Asuming-Brempong and Onumah (2014), agricultural 
households add on non-farm activities in order to accumulate funds for farm expansion and to 
solve pressing household needs (basic needs, health care, payment of school fees etc.). In 
2012/2013, about 3.7 million households, making up 44.3 percent of households in Ghana, 
operated non-farm enterprises, half (50.4%) of which were in urban localities while a little over 
one-third (36.8%) were in rural areas (GSS, 2014a). In 2005/2006, households that operated non-
farm activities were 3.2 million, representing 42 percent of all households (GSS, 2008). In 
Ghana, working children or child labourers play a very vital role in working to contribute to 
household farm and non-farm incomes (Zdunnek et al., 2008). This also means that households 
diversify their income portfolios having the labour of these child in mind. 
The Ghana Statistical Service defines child labour by adopting the ILO Convention 138 
that sets 15 years as the age below which children are not supposed to be involved in any form of 
work, especially economic activities that deprive the child of his/her health, education or 
development. All over the world, 215 million boys and girls are engaged in child labour and 115 
of these children are exposed to its worst forms. Sector-wise, data indicates that the highest 
incidence of child labour is in agriculture (60%) and 26 percent in services. This has made the 
ILO in collaboration with its agencies very focused on eliminating child labour from the 
agricultural sector and every attempt at doing this has mainly focused on educating these 
children. In the ILO’s“Roadmap for Achieving the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child 
Labour by 2016”,  the first action plan was to ask government to have the primary responsibility 
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for enforcing the right to education for all children since this will take the children out of the 
farms. Specifically, there was a call for the extension and improvement in access to free, 
compulsory, quality education for all children, with a particular focus on girls and ensuring that 
all children under the minimum age for employment are in full-time education (ILO, 2010). In 
Ghana, there is a capitation grant and a school feeding policy to increase school enrolment and 
sustain successes achieved. ISODEC’s (2010) report has shown that pursuing a combination of 
the capitation grant and school feeding programmes will increase the gross enrolment rate in 
public primary schools to about 106 percent within a ten year period leading to the 2020/2021 
academic year (rather than achieving 92 percent by providing only the capitation grant). Despite 
these efforts, child labour remains a challenge in Ghana, thus, calling for the child labour module 
in the sixth round of the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS6). 
Due to difficulties in and possible overlaps that will exist in an attempt to capture all 
categories of children who are engaged in specific light work (13 years), general employment 
(15 years) and hazardous work (18 years), studies have usually concentrated on children who are 
below 15 years but are economically engaged. The report of the GLSS6, with a special focus on 
child labour, also reported on economically active children. They reported on employed children 
aged 7 - 14 years by industry, locality of residence and sex and it showed that majority (91.2%) 
of the children was involved in farming (agriculture, forestry and fishing), followed by non-farm 
activities — wholesale and retail trade (13.2%). Among these children, the proportion of males 
(84.6%) involved in farm activities is greater than females (71.2%). At the household level, the 
time available for carrying out these activities by school-going children are as follows: after 
school (20%) before school (1%), before and after school (3%), on the weekend (66%), during 
missed school hours (3%) and during vacation (7%). As regards location, children in farm 
activities are more in the rural areas (88.2%) than in the urban areas (51.8%). For non-farm 
activities, children in the urban areas that are engaged in it is nearly five times (29.8%) their 
counterparts in the rural areas (6.7%). There are also more female children engaged in non-farm 
activities in the urban areas than in the rural areas (GSS, 2014a).  
Child labourers contribute immensely to the incomes of their households by either 
working directly on household farms, non-farm enterprises or working outside the home and 
contributing to total household income. It has been widely theorized that households from which 
child labourers emerge, survive on incomes of these children and use them to meet subsistence 
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needs (Basu & Van, 1998; Duryea, Hoek, & Levison, 2005). From a study in rural Ethiopia, 
Cockburn (2002) showed that child labourers, on the average, contribute 4 to 7 percent of 
household income, with some children actually contributing up to 50 percent. It is then not 
surprising for Ilahi, Orazem and Sedlacek (2005) to posit that children from poor families cannot 
afford to grow up before entering the labour market due to the reliance of their families on their 
incomes to meet current consumption needs. Available figures indicate that in 2001, about 27.7 
percent of Ghanaian children aged 5-14 years were economically employed (GSS, 2003) and this 
figure increased, marginally, to 28.8 percent in 2012/2013 among children in the same age 
bracket (GSS, 2014b).  
With regard to households’ involvement in farm and non-farm activities, studies 
conducted in Western Kenya (Olale & Henson, 2012) and in Mali (Abdulai & CroleRees, 2001) 
have shown that a household head’s education level, access to credit and geographical location 
are factors that explain a household’s farm and non-farm income diversification behaviour. 
Senadza (2014) used the GLSS 5 data and found that farm only, and farm combined with non-
farm self-employment dominated the adoption of income strategies by households by accounting 
for more than 80 percent of responses. It was also found that household characteristics such as 
age of the household head, household size composition, educational level and other household 
characteristics all play a role in explaining the adoption of income strategies by households. 
Senedza then called for a promotion of non-farm income opportunities to augment farm incomes. 
In a similar study, Agyeman et al. (2014), found that 65% of households in the Western Region 
of Ghana engaged in non-farm income-generating activities. They also showed that non-farm 
income accounted for 29.05% of total household income. In addition, the age of the household 
head, gender, productive assets owned, number of years of schooling, the nature of road and a 
few others were found to be significant in explaining income diversification of farm households 
in the same region. Cockburn (2002) also examined the contribution of children to household 
income by estimating a household income with the number of child labourers as an input and 
found the estimated average total income contribution per child labourer to be between 4.4 and 
6.8 percent. Cockburn’s paper stresses on how the number of child labourers (or working 
children) in a given household contribute significantly to total household income.  
From the information and arguments so far, it is clear that most households engage in 
both farm and non-farm activities as a risk-coping strategy and in doing this, child labourers and 
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their economic activities play a significant role in contributing to the total household income. But 
what has not been focused on, in previous studies, is the relative contribution of child labour to 
farm and non-farm incomes of households. Sendza (2014); Agyeman et al. (2014) examined 
households’ choice of income strategies adopted by Ghanaian households and stated that 
household composition played a significant role in explaining income diversification strategies 
but the role of child labourers was not the focus of these papers.  Also, the Child Labour Report 
of the sixth round of the Ghana Living Standards Survey only talks about the number of child 
labourers engaged in farm and non-farm activities but does not look at the relative contribution 
of these children to the incomes of households that have diversified their sources of income. 
Studies that come close are those of Menon, Pareli  and Rosati (2005) and Cockburn (2002) but 
that of Cockburn is the closest as he examined the contribution of children to household income 
by estimating a household income with child labour as an input but did not disaggregate this 
contribution into farm and non-farm components.  
To this end, this paper seeks to build on Cockburn’s (2002) study by modelling a 
household income with child labour as an input and estimating the average relative magnitude 
per child labourer on household farm and non-farm incomes. The research question addressed in 
the paper is whether there is a difference in the contribution per child labourer to household farm 
and non-farm incomes in income-diversified households. Another question is whether ILO’s 
policy prescription of educating children has the potency of eliminating child labour — on farm 
and non-farm? The paper tests the research hypothesis that the average (mean) difference in 
contribution per child labourer to household farm and non-farm incomes in income diversified 
households are statistically different from zero. The remaining sections of the paper are 
structured as follows. The next section examines theories related to child labour and household 
income, the third section discusses the methodology used in the study and is followed by the 
analysis and discussion of results. The last section concludes and offers recommendations. 
 
Theoretical Considerations 
The literature review is done in two levels, theoretical literature and empirical literature. 
Theoretically, two main issues are presented in this paper. The first has to do with the Altruistic 
model and Non-Altruistic model of child labour and the second has to with the Push and Pull 
factors that explain a household’s decision to adopt an income diversification strategy rather 
6 
 
concentrating purely on farm activity. The empirical literature deals with child labour and 
household-level characteristics that influence both farm and non-farm income.  
 
Altruistic and Non-altruistic models 
The altruistic model that was started by Basu and Van (1998) and built on by others, is 
one in which both the quantity (the number) and the quality (the consumption) of the children 
enter the parents’ utility function. Rosati and Tzannatos (2003) assumed in their study that 
parents control their children’s time when they are young and time can either be spent on work 
or on school. Children’s labour benefits current consumption while their schooling has a future 
effect. They also assumed that parents have control over all the incomes that accrue from the 
works of both adults and children. This reflects in the fact that until children mature, their 
activities are controlled by their parents. Rosati and Tzannatos (2003) defined child labour as 
work on the household farm or in the household business (in this case, non-farm enterprise). The 
conclusions drawn are that increment in household income should reduce child labour supplied 
by the household unless households have access to and make use of the capital market to engage 
in intergenerational transfers. Nonetheless, if parents consider their children as assets, explaining 
the non-altruistic aspect of parents’ behaviour, an increase in household income will not 
necessarily reduce the supply of children’s labour by the household. One point to note from the 
model is that when the model is extended to include cases where children work in the labour 
market, the results that will be obtained will not change in any relevant way. In a similar 
explanation, Fan (2011) stated that if parents have a greater taste for children’s leisure, the less 
likely they are to send out their children to work and vice versa 
 
Push and Pull factors and Income Diversification 
The push and pull factors distinctively explain households reasons to engage in income 
diversification strategies. According to Reardon, Berdegué, Barrett and Stamoulis (2007), 
households’ reasons to diversify in order to accumulate resources are caused by “pull factors” 
and these pull factors are usually a corollary of the upward spiral of incomes and assets for the 
households thus engaged. On the other hand, “push factors” are those that account for 
households’ income diversification in order to manage risk, cope with shock, or escape from 
agriculture in stagnation or in secular decline and these factors usually come with high levels of 
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households’ economic impoverishment. An example of the pull factors is any type that attracts 
households to the non-farm sector when the non-farm activities offer higher returns compared to 
farming (Egyei & Adzovor, 2013). Examples of the push factors are income coping mechanisms, 
diminishing or time-varying returns to productive assets, risk management, long-term constraints 
or smoothing household consumption (Ellis, 2000; Reardon et al., (2007). 
Empirically, household characteristics have been documented as significantly influencing 
household income. In a study by Ibekwe (2010), age did not significantly explain farm income, 
although having a positive sign while Tuyen (2014) also explained that the income effect of the 
age of household members might be ambiguous because households with younger working 
members are more likely to undertake non-farm jobs, which in turn might earn higher incomes. 
With regard to sex of the household head, Aikaeli (2010) found that income was lower in 
female-headed households than in male-headed ones. Household members’ education is often 
found to positively affect household income (Estudillo, Sawada, & Otsuka, 2008) but it should 
be noted that the educational levels of farmers in Ghana are generally low (ISSER, 2012). There 
is also evidence that investment in inputs, in both farm and non-farm activities, yield positive 
income-returns to households (Martinez, 2004). 
 
Methodology 
Data 
The empirical analysis for this paper was done using data from the Ghana Living 
Standards Survey Round 6 (GLSS6) which was collected within twelve (12) months, from 18th 
October 2012 to 17th October 2013. The GLSS6, like earlier rounds focuses on the household as 
the key socio-economic unit and provides valuable information on the living conditions and 
well-being of households in Ghana. The survey, using a probability sampling approach, was 
designed to provide information on household and individual level indicators that are nationally 
and regionally representative. The topics covered in this survey included education, health, 
employment, housing conditions, migration, tourism, housing conditions, household agriculture, 
and access to financial services and asset ownership (GSS, 2014a).The GLSS6, compared to 
previous rounds, had a distinguishing feature of introducing a Labour Force Survey module with 
additional sections on Child Labour. This makes the GLSS6 the second nationwide survey that 
provides information on child labour. The first standalone Ghana Child Labour Survey was 
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conducted in 2000 by the Ghana Statistical Service.  In all, a nationally representative sample of 
18,000 households in 1,200 enumeration areas was covered by the survey. The survey covered a 
nationally representative sample of 18,000 households in 1,200 enumeration areas. Of the 18,000 
households, 16,772 were successfully enumerated leading to a response rate of 93.2 percent. 
After merging, the number of households reduced to 2,205. Logging some of the variables also 
resulted in further missing observations, especially the farm income that reduced to 1,929. Since 
the model uses a square matrix, missing observations in specific rows reduced the final 
observation in model 1 to 1,658. For model 2 and 3, missing observations in the child education 
variable resulted in a further drop in the number of observations to 1,506 after estimation. 
 
Model Specification 
A Theoretical Model of Child Labour Allocation 
The study adapts and makes significant modifications to the Newman and Gertler’s 
(1994) household unitary decision making model for labour allocation within the household, 
which was also used by Kurosaki (2001). The model in this study explains the allocation of child 
labourers into farm and non-farm activities. We acknowledge that a household allocates other 
members of the household to all economic activities but the theoretical modelling in this study is 
done with a focus on child labourers. 
In this study, a risk-neutral household derives income y from child labour (ers) 
( 1,..., )i N  in the household. The household also derives utility
1 2(s , ,..., ),Ns s from the 
schooling of these children — where (.) is a concave function that can be decoupled from 
utility from income y . Resources available to the household (including time) are allocated 
between all other household consumption and schooling. Also, the allocation of household 
consumption among children is based on the level of y , which is treated as the numéraire for 
measuring the net returns to child labour which are denoted in real terms. 
The household faces a budget constraint and N time constraints, one for each child (used 
for economic activities and for school). Each child can be made to engage in M economic 
activities (either farm or a non-farm) each of which yields a net return to child labour jf . More 
formally, the household’s optimization is expressed as 
1 2
CL
max    y+ (s , ,..., ),
ij
Ns s                                                                        (1) 
9 
 
Subject to a budget constraint 
0 1 2
1
( , ,..., ; ) ,
M
j j j Nj j
j
y f CL CL CL X y

                                                         (2) 
Time constraints 
1
1
, ,    1,..., ,
M
j i i
j
CL s T i N

                                                                          (3) 
 
and non-negativity conditions for child labour allocation variables, where 0y  is a non-child 
labour income including the sum of returns to household assets, ijCL is hours of work by a child 
labourer i in activity j which is constrained as non-negative, jX is a vector of household farm-
level and non-farm-level characteristics such as age of the household head, number of child 
labourers, geographical location, gender of the household head and many others. Specifically, we 
make iT the time child labourer i allocates between school and engagement in economic 
activities.  
 
The first order conditions for the optimization consist of the following Kuhn-Tucker (M × N) 
equations 
 
0,      0,      C ( ) 0i iij ij
ij i ij i
f f
CL L
CL s CL s
   
    
   
                          (4) 
This expression shows that the household allocates child labourers according to a 
comparative advantage principle, which is determined by the marginal returns to child labour 
/i ijf CL  For example, when a child labourer can earn more in a non-farm activity than his 
activity on the farm, the household allocates him/her to the non-farm employment even if the 
absolute level of his/her marginal contribution to farm activity is higher than those of other 
children in the household. This study seeks to empirically estimate the actual shape of /i ijf CL  . 
Since the aim of this study is to determine the relative contribution of child labour to farm 
and non-farm income, the estimation has to be done simultaneously and this calls for two 
separate models that are seemingly unrelated but are related by errors (Zellner, 1962). 
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The Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model 
The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system by Zellner (1962) involves several 
individual relationships that are linked by the fact that their disturbances are correlated. In the 
case of modelling the demand of a household for different commodities, the correlation emanates 
from several sources such as correlated shocks to household income which has the power of 
affecting all models simultaneously.The motivations for using SUR are gains from efficiency in 
estimation by combining information on different equations and the imposition and/or testing of 
restrictions that involve parameters in different equations (Moon & Perron, 2006). The 
coefficients of a particular variable (say child labour) can be compared after conducting a t-test 
for equality of coefficients (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Stata, 2013). Yahya, Adebayo, Jolayemi, 
Oyejola, and Sanni (2008) present the SUR model as depicted by a system of equations made up 
of m dependent variables, each containing n observations denoted by the vector 
1 2,( , ... ,y )mY y y
   
with associated distinct vector of explanatory variables 
1 2, ,... ,XmX X  respectively. According to 
Cameron and Trivedi (2010), the error terms are assumed to have zero mean and to be 
independent across individuals and are homoscedastic. 
 
The systems of equations can be written as that presented below. 
1 1 1 10
       
0
1                1    1
m m m m
i i
i i
XY
y X
y X
mn mn p p mn

 
 

      
      
      
      
      
 
    
                                                     (5) 
 
And when stacked together, the whole system becomes 
 
Y X                                                                                                         (6) 
 
Estimating each of the equations separately by OLS may still yield consistent but 
inefficient estimates of the regression parameters. The inefficiency arises from the possible 
correlation between the errors in the separated equations 21, ,..., )( m   which calls for the use of 
the SUR model that employs the Generalised Least Squares estimation (GLS). In the SUR 
estimation, the correlations among the errors in different equations are used to improve the 
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regression estimates. Also, the greater the correlation between these errors and the more 
significant the error term, the more efficient the SUR estimates. In special cases where the set of 
explanatory variables is the same in each equation, the efficiency gains in the SUR model 
disappear, as per the Krusal’s 1968 theorem (Moon & Perron, 2006), and the SUR estimation 
reduces to OLS (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). Another possible problem has to do with the 
presence of multicollinearity. 
Recognising the effect of multicollinearity on the efficiency of SUR estimators and the 
non-existence of any solution or remedy on how to select covariates in SUR to avoid 
multicollinearity,  Yahya et al. (2008) conducted a study to determine ‘Tolerable Non-orthogonal 
Correlation Points’ (TNCP) among the predictors at which the efficiency of SUR estimators will 
still be preserved. Three conclusions can be drawn from their study. (1) No matter the level of 
multicollinearity among covariates in a given SUR system of equations, related by error terms, 
the SUR estimator will still be efficient when the sample size is large (when n ≥ 500). (2) If 
multicollinearity in any separate equation in a system of equations fall within the end-points of 
 0.2 , SUR estimators will still be efficient. (3) SUR estimator is always better than the 
equation-by-equation method of OLS in estimating a system of equations, which are related by 
error terms.   
 
Description of the Simulation Process  
In doing the simulation, three separate SUR models were estimated. The first model 
(Model 1) was estimated without the number of hours these child labourers spend in school. The 
second model (Model 2) was estimated by the introduction of the number of hours the child 
labourers spend in school to see the upward or downward biasedness of the education variable 
and how it will influence the effect the child labour variable on the response variable. Finally, the 
third model (Model 3) was one with an inclusion of an interaction term for number of child 
labourers in each household and the number of hours they spend in school. The motive here was 
to derive the net effect (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010) of child labour on farm and non-farm income 
in the situation where parents have heeded to advice/policy and have sent their wards to school. 
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Empirical models 
The potential challenge of “disappearance of efficiency gains” and “reduction of the SUR 
model to OLS” is avoided in this study by making sure expl nfinp appears only in the non-farm 
model because it is a non-farm specific variable and also the expl finp appears only in the farm 
model for a similar reason. Also, This VIF’s were generated for all separate equations in this 
study to see whether they violate the multicollinearity assumption so that, when they do, we can 
proceed to check whether they fall within the end-points of  0.2 .  
 
SUR Model 1: Without Child’s Hours Present at School 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
exp
exp
Nfarm i i i i i i i i i
farm i i i i i i i i i
Y chdl age edu urb male acc l nfinp reg e
Y chdl age edu urb male acc l finp reg
        
         
          

          
(7) 
 
SUR Model 2: With Child’s Hours present at School 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9
exp
         
exp
       
Nonfarm i i i i i i i i
i i
farm i i i i i i i i
i i
Y chdl age edu urb male acc l nfinp schrs
reg
Y chdl age edu urb male acc l finp schrs
reg
        
 
        
 
         

  

         
  
(8) 
 
SUR Model 3: With Interaction of number of Child labourers and Hours Present at School 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9
10 11
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9
10
exp
         
exp
        +
Nonfarm i i i i i i i i
i i i
farm i i i i i i i i
Y chdl age edu urb male acc l nfinp schrs
chdlschrs reg
Y chdl age edu urb male acc l finp schrs
chdl
        
  
        

        
  
        
11i i ischrs reg 





  
 (9) 
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Table 1: Definition, Measurement and A’ Priori Signs of Variables 
Variables  Definition of the Variables A Priori Sign A Priori Sign 
YNfarm Log of gross household non-farm income — 
Yfarm Log of gross household farm income — 
chdl Number of child labourers in each household Positive 
age Age of the household head Positive 
edu A four-level categorical variable for the education of the head of the 
household (0=no education, 1=primary, 2=secondary, 3=post-
secondary/tertiary) 
Indeterminate 
urb (location) A dummy variable that captures the location of the 
household (1=urban, 0=rural) 
Indeterminate 
male (sex) A dummy variable that captures the sex of the 
household head (0=male, 1=female) 
Indeterminate 
acc A binary variable for ownership of account by the head of the 
household (1=owns account, 0=no account) 
Positive 
lexpnfinp Log of total value/cost of investment in all non-farm inputs – e.g. 
technology 
Positive 
lexpfinp Log of total value/cost of investment in  all farm inputs – e.g. land & 
seeds  
Positive 
schrs child hours present at school Negative 
chdlschrs An interaction (moderation) of number of child labourers in each 
household and child hours present at school  
Positive 
Region Categorical variable that captures regional effect  Indeterminate 
Source: Authors’ construct (2015) 
 
Results and Discussion 
The analysis is done (Table 2) on the child labour variable with reference to all the three 
models but Model 3 is the model of focus for the other covariates. The Breusch-Pagan test of 
independence for all the three models are significant at one percent, which indicates the 
existence of a correlation of the residuals in the non-farm and farm income models and that we 
reject the null hypothesis that this correlation is zero. The VIF’s for the separate models in all the 
three models were less than ten (10) which indicates, by extension, that none of the SUR models 
suffered from multicollinearity. Apart from Model 1 that had the t-test for child labour being 
significant at 10 percent, the t-test for child labour in the other models were all significant at one 
percent which gives credence to the comparison of relative contributions of child labour. The t-
test for the interaction term is also significant at one percent and allows for the derivation of the 
net-effect of child labour on the response variables.  
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All the three models indicated how child labourers contribute significantly to household 
income, whether farm or non-farm. This confirms the findings of Duryea et al. (2005) and 
Cockburn (2002). Model 1 shows that for every Gh₵1.00 a child labourer contributes to farm 
income, that child contributes Gh₵1.24 to non-farm income ( 1
1

 ). This was when the education 
of the child (number of hours present at school) had not been factored into the model. After the 
education of the child labourer was introduced in Model 2, the gap between the relative 
contributions widened to a ratio of Gh₵1.00:Gh₵2.33 ( 1
1

 ) for farm and non-farm income 
respectively. In Model 3, the relative contribution of child labour was moderated by the 
introduction of an interaction of Child labour and child education. This was done to know the 
relative contribution of a school-going child labourer as he/she spends more time in school 
(based on the derived net effect). After doing this, the gap narrowed slightly to a ratio of 
Gh₵1.00:Gh₵2.12 (see calculation in appendix) for farm and non-farm income respectively. 
This still shows that school-going child labourers in income-diversified homes contribute more 
to household non-farm income than they do for farm income. Several implications can be drawn 
from this.   
First of all, after these child labourers spend time at school they do not go to the farm, but 
rather engage in non-farm economic activities for the household that yield returns. In Ghana and 
many other SSA countries, farming is done from morning till late afternoon when farmers are 
preparing to return to the household. Perhaps parents diversify their income portfolios having 
these children in mind based on returns from their services. Some children also go out of their 
way to engage in other jobs outside the home to add to household income. In this wise, it should 
also be pointed out that they are likely to be engaged in non-farm related activities because time 
after school makes it difficult to go working on any farm. The second reason is that most farms 
are very far from home and thus becomes a disincentive to ask a child to go to the farm after 
school. In this case, non-farm activities make parents non-altruistic towards children since they 
consider these children as assets in the income-diversification process. Again, child labour acts 
as a push factor when parents add on non-farm activities as a risk-coping strategy. 
We can say that it seems policy regarding the moving of child labourers from farms by 
educating them is having an impact but this child labour education policy may have a 
paradoxical effect as it can end up pushing these child labourers into non-farm related activities.  
15 
 
An increase in age of the household head by a year reduces non-farm income (at 1%) but 
increases farm income at a 10 percent alpha level. With regard to education, higher levels of 
education are related to higher non-farm income levels but when it comes to farm income, those 
with higher levels of education rather had lower income. This is because farming activities in 
Ghana are dominated by people with lower levels of education (ISSER, 2012). Those in the 
urban locations experienced non-farm income levels that were Gh₵0.2457 higher than their rural 
counterparts while urban household realised farm incomes that were Gh₵0.2269 lower than that 
of their rural counterparts. This is also not surprising because farming has predominantly been a 
rural phenomenon in Ghana and SSA at large. Male-headed households realized incomes that 
were 0.24 more that female headed households, confirming Aikaeli’s (2010) finding. Household 
heads that own account earn non-farm incomes of 0.35 more than those without accounts at one 
percent alpha level but account ownership was not significant in explaining household farm 
income.  
A percentage change in the cost of non-farm inputs also increase non-farm incomes by 40 
percent at an alpha level of one percent. A percentage change in the cost of farm inputs also 
increases farm incomes by 47 percent at an alpha level of one percent. This is because investing 
in key inputs increase productivity and hence increase income (Martinez, 2004). With regard to 
the regional dummies, all other regions made lower non-farm incomes compared to households 
in the Western Region. For the regional dummies and farm income, all households in other 
regions earned lesser incomes than those in the Western region. This is expected because 
agriculture (from cocoa, timber to palm) thrives very well in the Western Region of Ghana.    
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
This paper aimed at estimating the relative contribution of child labour to household farm 
and non-farm income and to ascertain whether ILO’s policy prescription of educating children 
has the potency of eliminating child labour – calling for a simulation with child education. The 
findings confirmed that child labourers contribute significantly to household income, whether 
farm or non-farm (Duryea et al., 2005; Cockburn, 2002). Specifically, as a child labourer spends 
more time in school, every Gh₵1.00 contributed to farm income is accompanied by a Gh₵2.12 
contribution towards non-farm income. Without considering the education of the child labourer, 
the story is different as the relative contributing is in the ratio of Gh₵1.00:Gh₵1.24 for farm and 
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non-farm income respectively. Once parents find children’s labour in non-farm activities as 
contributing more to the household total income, it is likely to serve as a push factor that will 
motivate parents to direct these children into engaging more in these activities (wholesale and 
retailing). This, then, means that any policy of educating children is effective in eliminating child 
labour in the agricultural sector, as recommended by the ILO, but has the paradoxical possibility 
of getting these child labourers into non-farm economic activities. The reason is that most of 
these non-farm jobs are done by children after school and over the weekends. One issue to also 
note is that spending more time in school is a necessary condition but, sufficiently, academic 
activities continue in the house and what time will these children have to continue academic life 
at home when they are busily working to earn a living? 
The policy from this finding is that governments must provide adequate remuneration for 
workers and pay a good price for agricultural products so that households do not diversify their 
income portfolios, having children in mind. Also state agencies, including the ministry of 
education and international bodies like the ILO must work at providing a holistic child education 
policy that will seek to sensitise parents on the need to educate their children and desist from the 
act of asking children to combine school with work that may be deleterious to their current 
education and future livelihood as adults.  
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Table 2: SUR Model for Relative Contribution of Child Labour to Household Farm and Non-Farm Income 
 Without Child’s Hours Present at 
School 
 With Child’s Hours present at 
School 
 With Interaction of Child labour 
and Hours Present at School 
VARIABLES Log (gross non-
farm income 
Log (gross 
Farm income 
 Log (gross non-
farm income 
Log (gross 
Farm income 
 Log (gross non-
farm income 
Log (gross 
Farm income 
 (Coefficients) (Coefficients)  (Coefficients) (Coefficients)  (Coefficients) (Coefficients) 
         
Number of child labourers 0.0480* 0.0386*  0.1452*** 0.0622**  0.6495*** 0.5309*** 
 (0.0269) (0.0231)  (0.0347) (0.0297)  (0.1399) (0.1186) 
Age of household head -0.0092*** 0.0032  -0.0086*** 0.0045*  -0.0086*** 0.0045* 
 (0.0028) (0.0024)  (0.0029) (0.0025)  (0.0029) (0.0025) 
Education of household head (Base=No 
education) 
        
Primary School 0.2034** 0.1775**  0.1260 0.1067  0.1129 0.0944 
 (0.0938) (0.0800)  (0.1001) (0.0849)  (0.0997) (0.0845) 
Secondary School 0.2730** -0.1172  0.2552** -0.2179**  0.2457** -0.2269** 
 (0.1071) (0.0914)  (0.1130) (0.0958)  (0.1125) (0.0953) 
Post-Sec and Tertiary 0.3669* -0.1771  0.2169 -0.2945*  0.1963 -0.3136* 
 (0.1875) (0.1593)  (0.1992) (0.1681)  (0.1984) (0.1673) 
Urban (1=urban, 0=rural)) 0.1104 -0.5521***  0.2440*** -0.4766***  0.2307** -0.4890*** 
 (0.0849) (0.0722)  (0.0937) (0.0794)  (0.0933) (0.0791) 
Male (1=male, 0=female) 0.1414 0.4709***  0.1791* 0.5536***  0.1599 0.5361*** 
 (0.0938) (0.0824)  (0.0987) (0.0865)  (0.0984) (0.0861) 
Account ownership 0.3624*** 0.0722  0.3568*** 0.0402  0.3549*** 0.0387 
 (0.0781) (0.0674)  (0.0809) (0.0697)  (0.0806) (0.0693) 
Log(total value/cost of investment in  0.3739*** —   0.3995*** —  0.3997*** — 
         all non-farm inputs – e.g. technology) (0.0221) —  (0.0241) —  (0.0240) — 
Log(total value/cost of investment in   — 0.4822***  — 0.4754***  — 0.4749*** 
         all farm inputs - land & seeds) — (0.0232)  — (0.0245)  — (0.0244) 
Log(child weekly hours present at  — —  -0.1914*** 0.0156  0.1120 0.2976*** 
        school) — —  (0.0516) (0.0438)  (0.0964) (0.0816) 
Child labourers X child hours at school — —  — —  -0.1139*** -0.1058*** 
 — —  — —  (0.0306) (0.0259) 
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Region(Base=Western)         
Central -1.0834*** -0.0328  -1.2351*** -0.0819  -1.2400*** -0.0870 
 (0.2140) (0.1845)  (0.2195) (0.1881)  (0.2185) (0.1871) 
Greater Accra -0.6314*** -0.6660***  -0.8107*** -0.6855***  -0.8026*** -0.6778*** 
 (0.2339) (0.1955)  (0.2471) (0.2047)  (0.2460) (0.2036) 
Volta -0.5602*** -0.5560***  -0.6694*** -0.4749***  -0.6360*** -0.4436*** 
 (0.1438) (0.1220)  (0.1530) (0.1295)  (0.1526) (0.1290) 
Eastern -0.7882*** -0.2942**  -1.0139*** -0.2937**  -0.9834*** -0.2653** 
 (0.1392) (0.1166)  (0.1468) (0.1214)  (0.1463) (0.1209) 
Ashanti 0.0751 -0.5687***  -0.0670 -0.5918***  -0.0539 -0.5797*** 
 (0.1436) (0.1225)  (0.1501) (0.1270)  (0.1494) (0.1264) 
BrongAhafo -0.1613 -0.0411  -0.2823* -0.0940  -0.2803* -0.0921 
 (0.1474) (0.1256)  (0.1521) (0.1288)  (0.1514) (0.1281) 
Northern -0.3848** -0.2896**  -0.5035*** -0.4018***  -0.4440*** -0.3464** 
 (0.1526) (0.1299)  (0.1635) (0.1383)  (0.1635) (0.1382) 
Upper East -0.4483** -0.6390***  -0.5522*** -0.6222***  -0.5566*** -0.6265*** 
 (0.1928) (0.1641)  (0.2039) (0.1728)  (0.2029) (0.1718) 
Upper West -0.2819 -0.9982***  -0.4986** -1.0938***  -0.5945*** -1.1827*** 
 (0.1860) (0.1584)  (0.2003) (0.1696)  (0.2011) (0.1701) 
Constant 0.8586*** 4.4509***  1.4786*** 4.3332***  0.1989 3.1470*** 
 (0.2227) (0.2308)  (0.3155) (0.3013)  (0.4658) (0.4164) 
         
Observations 1,658 1,658  1,506 1,506  1,506 1,506 
R-squared 0.2307 0.3496  0.2388 0.3524  0.2457 0.3595 
VIF 1.62 1.64  1.61 1.64  4.76 4.70 
Breusch-Pagan test (independence of errors) [chi2(1) =10.203Pr = 0.0014]  [chi2(1) =9.899   Pr = 0.0017]  [chi2(1) =7.805   Pr=0.0052] 
Paired t-test of child Labour [chi2(2)=5.56        Pr =0.0621]  [chi2(2)= 20.62Pr =0.0000]  [chi2(2) =38.82   Pr=0.000  ] 
Paired t-test of Child labourers X child hours at 
school 
    [chi2(2) =28.47Pr=0.000  ] 
Standard errors in parentheses          
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ computation using GLSS6 data 
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Appendix 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Variables used in Estimating the Relative Contribution of 
Child Labour to Household Farm and Non-Farm Income 
Variables 
Observations Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
gross non-farm income 1,056 17.1775 98.4213 0.013 2,963.2 
gross non-farm income 1,056 5,656.56 23,307.6 2.43333 472,380 
Number of child labourers 1,056 2.39476 1.3088 1 7 
Age of household head 1,056 48.775 13.0225 21 90 
Total value/cost of investment in all non-
farm inputs - technology) 1,056 57.6731 213.41 0.04 2,931.59 
Total value/cost of investment in all farm 
inputs - land & seeds) 1,056 3,041.86 40,745.5 0.66667 925,600 
child weekly hours present at school 1,056 4.3123 0.8716 0 6.3869 
Child labourers X child hours at school 1,056 10.8249 6.8420 0 38.3213 
Education of household head 
(Base=No education) 
     Primary School 1,056 — — 0 1 
Secondary School 1,056 — — 0 1 
Post-Sec and Tertiary 1,056 — — 0 1 
Urban (1=urban, 0=rural)) 1,056 — — 0 1 
Male (1=male, 0=female) 1,056 — — 0 1 
Account ownership (1=account, 0=no 
account) 1,056 
— — 
0 1 
Region(Base=Western) 
     Central 1,056 —  — 0 1 
Greater Accra 1,056 — — 0 1 
Volta 1,056 — — 0 1 
Eastern 1,056 — — 0 1 
Ashanti 1,056 — — 0 1 
BrongAhafo 1,056 — — 0 1 
Northern 1,056 — — 0 1 
Upper East 1,056 — — 0 1 
Upper West 1,056 — — 0 1 
Source: Authors’ computation using GLSS6 data 
 
Net effect of child labour on farm and Non-farm income 
1 10
1 10
Net effect of child labour
0.5309-0.1058*4.3123 1
                                            
0.6495-0.1139*4.3123 2.12
schrs
schrs
 
 




 
